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I. INTRODUCTION
I still don't get it. I can see why as partisans of this or that set
of policies we will still care about how district lines are drawn, even if
each district has an equal number of voters. We might wish to maxi-
mize black representation. We might wish to elect Democrats, or
liberals, or incumbents. What I cannot see, however, is why the
Constitution, or a supposedly nonpartisan measure like the Voting
Rights Act,I should be enlisted in these partisan battles.
Professor Karlan does an admirable job of exploring whether
and to what extent blacks benefit politically from being concentrated
in a small number of districts rather than being spread more thinly
among more districts.2 I cannot gainsay anything she says. My prob-
lem with what she says is not that I think she is wrong, but that I do
not understand the normative principles from which she is proceeding
and that animate her concern. To put it simply: Why should the law
care whether blacks-or Democrats, or anyone else--benefit from a
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I would like to
thank Professor Barry Friedman, Ellen Armentrout, and all the members of the Vanderbilt Law
Review who helped organize and run this Symposium. I would also like to thank the Florida
Law Review for granting me permission to borrow heavily from my article Lost in the Political
Thicket, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 563 (1989).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1994 ed.).
2. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 291 (1997).
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particular way of drawing district lines, so long as the principle of
"one-person, one-vote" is repected?
The bogey here, I take it, is something called "vote dilution."
The drawing of district lines matters, we are told, because not every
"one-person, one-vote" system is kosher. Some systems that formally
comply with "one-person, one-vote" involve "diluting" the votes of
some groups, while others do not. This dilution undermines the
equality of the franchise that "one-person, one-vote" is meant to
establish.
Now the point of this argument is presumably not the trivial
truth that every way of drawing district lines affects who gets elected,
what policies they support, and ultimately the legislative product.
Everyone knows that. Moreover, because the manner in which
district lines are drawn ultimately affects what laws get passed, there
is no such thing as a "neutral" way to draw lines. Of course, we could
draw lines by some random method, under which no one controls the
outcome. But the outcome would not itself be neutral, since it would
inevitably produce some partisan mix of policies. Indeed, there are no
neutral outcomes in districting because every outcome will produce its
own particular partisan mix of policies.
We therefore need some normative principle to tell us when we
have drawn district lines and produced the partisan mix of policies we
should produce, and when we have drawn district lines and produced
the wrong policies. In the latter case we can be deemed to have
"diluted" votes in the sense that we have distributed them in a way
disfavored by our normative principle.
At this point I need to make a very painful confession. A few
years ago I wrote an article for a symposium in a law review 3-a
symposium which contained several articles from very eminent legal
academics, 4 I might add-and in that article I said essentially the
same things I am about to say here. And here is the painful part:
That article met with the worst fate that can befall an article. It was
not ripped to shreds by critics. Rather, it was totally ignored by the
entire academy. Only a student note in a recent Stanford Law Review
devotes any attention to it and confirms that it was indeed published
and is not a figment of my imagination. 5
3. Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 563 (1989).
4. Frank I. Michelman, Anthony E. Cook, C. Edwin Baker, Terrance Sandalow, Sanford
Levinson, Elizabeth Mensch, Alan Freeman, Daniel A. Farber, Martha Minow, and Nell Minow.
5. Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of Arrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 295 (1995).
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Now there are two hypotheses for why an article is so thor-
oughly ignored. The first is that it is so powerful and unanswerable
that everyone understands that there is nothing more to say about the
subject it addresses. The other is that it is so obviously misguided
and silly that kindness dictates not commenting. Although I would
like to believe the first hypothesis, the fact that discussion of vote
dilution has proceeded unabated, and indeed has intensified since
Shaw v. Reno,6 prevents me from claiming to have had the last word.
Therefore, I must assume that I have been ignored as an act of
mercy. That means that repeating myself, as I am about to do, can be
considered as tempting the wrath of the gods who saw fit to spare me
public ridicule the first time around. Yet I am called upon by the
occasion to say something; because I only know this one song, I am
afraid I shall have to sing it again.
7
II. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
We are looking for a normative principle to guide the vote
dilution inquiry. That is, we are looking for a particular conception of
democracy from which we might deduce how district lines should be
drawn. There are two basic types of such conceptions of democracy.
The first type is a substantive conception of democracy, and the sec-
ond is a procedural conception of democracy.
The substantive conception would have us draw district lines
by reference to a set of policy outcomes that moral theory deems ideal.
Put differently, the substantive conception requires an institutional
design-the drawing of electoral districts-that is empirically best
suited to achieving results independently justifiable under one's pre-
ferred moral theory. Ronald Dworkin labels this substantive concep-
tion of democracy the "dependent" conception because whether a
process is considered democratic depends on its ability to achieve
desired substantive results.8
By contrast, the procedural conception of democracy-which
Professor Dworkin calls the "detached" conception-addresses
6. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
7. Much of what follows quotes and paraphrases extensively from Alexander, 41 Fla. L.
Rev. at 569-76 (cited in note 3).





equality of power over political decisions. It concerns itself solely with
decisional input, not with the decisions themselves. For example, a
procedural conception might rule out deviations from "one-person,
one-vote," even if the deviations likely would lead to electing a
legislature more inclined to enact morally attractive legislation.
Suppose we accept the substantive conception of democracy as
our standard for determining vote dilution. In that case, a court must
proceed in the following manner whenever an individual or class
brings a constitutional action premised on vote dilution. First, the
court must ask what kind of legislation would be morally ideal.
Second, the court must determine whether the challenged districting
plan is less likely than some alternative plan to produce a legislature
that will enact this morally ideal legislation. Third, if the court de-
termines that the districting plan is inferior under that standard, it
must then ask what interests will be hurt or slighted under the plan
as compared to what should happen under an ideal districting plan.
Finally, the court must relate the problems with this deviation from
an ideal districting plan to some constitutional provision. 10
Although the substantive conception of democracy yields a
conception of vote dilution, this conception is not an attractive candi-
date for judicial enforcement under the Constitution for obvious rea-
sons. For example, why does the constitutional concern for morally
ideal legislation focus on testing districting plans that are two steps
away from ideal legislation? If the Constitution is concerned with a
morally ideal legislative program, why is that concern not imple-
mented directly by constitutionalizing such a program? And what
constitutional provisions embody this concern with ideal legislation
through districting?
Beyond these textual problems lurk enormous institutional
ones as well. Does anyone believe that the courts should proceed into
moral theory and political science as far as this conception of vote
dilution requires? To determine both the morally-required political
program and the districting scheme most likely to produce it would
place courts far deeper into the "political thicket" than even Justice
10. For example, while the Equal Protection Clause seems an appropriate constitutional
peg on which to hang attacks on districting plans that threaten "equality interests," is it the
appropriate peg for attacks on districting schemes that threaten other interests as well? Or
should all attacks on districting schemes be brought under the umbrella of the heretofore non-
justiciable Guarantee Clause of Article IV? See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (dismissing a case challenging state referendum and initiative provisions
for want of jurisdiction).
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Frankfurter could have imagined in his darkest nightmares.11 Merely
to describe this conception of vote dilution shows how alien is the
judicial role it assumes.
1 2
In sum, the substantive conception of democracy does yield a
conception of vote dilution in the abstract. Or if "dilution" seems to
mischaracterize the problem, perhaps "vote maldistribution" is a more
appropriate term. Terminology aside, however, the substantive con-
ception is neither one that easily relates to the constitutional text nor
one we would want judicially enforced. Its oddity as a conception of
democracy is highlighted by the following paradox: In order to struc-
ture voting, we must already know how the vote should turn out.
The procedural conception of democracy also yields a particu-
lar conception of vote dilution. Under the procedural conception of
democracy, every voter's vote should count equally, and the candidate
or proposal with the majority of votes should win. In other words, the
procedural conception of democracy relies upon the principle of "one-
person, one-vote" and the related principle of majority rule. The
Supreme Court has already constitutionalized the principle of "one-
person, one-vote" under the Equal Protection Clause. 13 The focus here
will therefore be on majoritarianism and its implications for vote
dilution.
III. ARROW'S PROBLEM, MAJORITARIANISM, AND VOTE DILUTION
The baseline for assessing vote dilution under a procedural
majoritarian conception of democracy is a situation in which a major-
ity of voters within a jurisdiction agree on all aspects of a legislative
program and on all other relevant qualities they would like their
representatives to possess. Under such circumstances, the procedural
conception would demand a districting plan designed to elect
11. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (stating that the "remedy for unfair-
ness in districting is to... invoke the ample powers of Congress").
12. But see Charles Beitz, Equal Opportunity in Political Representation, in Norman E.
Bowie, ed., Equal Opportunity 155, 168-71 (Westview, 1988) (endorsing just such a judicial role).
See also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and The Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1134-53 (1991) (apparently endorsing a
conception of voting equality mandating proportional shares of policy outcomes--"proportionate
interest representation"--though without defining how to individuate "interests" or rank them
without running afoul of Arrow's problem, see notes 14-19 and accompanying text, and without
relating this bizarre idea to the constitutional text).




legislators who would enact the majority agenda and would possess
the other characteristics deemed relevant by the majority. In other
words, the ideal baseline is direct democracy by a majority like-
minded on all programs and personalities. Vote dilution in this
scenario would consist of any legal impediment encountered by the
majority in electing its candidates and enacting its programs. Vote
dilution would constitute a harm exclusively to the majority: Under
the procedural conception, voters who turn out to be in the minority
ideally should have no influence on what is enacted and who is elected.
Now let us move from this imaginary world, in which an un-
changing majority of voters agree on everything relevant, to the real
world in which majorities shift depending upon the issue or personal-
ity under consideration. In this world, the concept of vote dilution
becomes indeterminate. Given only the two constraints that all votes
should be given the same weight and that the majority should win, we
no longer can determine what legislative program should be enacted
and what representatives should be elected. If we cannot determine
what personalities and programs "the majority" would choose, we
cannot determine the standard from which a deviation constitutes
"vote dilution."
Failure to find a cohesive majority on all issues leads to this
indeterminacy because of Arrow's problem. 14 Professor Arrow proved
that democratic procedures for determining policy cannot avoid the
possibility of the following dilemma. When the policy choices are A,
B, and C, and the voters are V1, V2, and V3, it is possible for V1 and
V2 to favor A over B; it is possible for V2 and V3 to favor B over C;
and it is possible for V1 and V3 to favor C over A.15 In such a situ-
ation, majority rule produces indeterminate results. 16 Every policy a
majority favors can be trumped by another policy favored by a differ-
ent majority in an endless cycle. Unless restrictions are placed on the
voters' agenda, extra weight is given to some voters' votes, or some
other objectionable constraints are placed on the voters, this possi-
bility of endless cycling is unavoidable. 17
14. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2-8 (Wiley, 2d ed. 1963).
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3, 51-59.
17. The conditions Arrow identifies as necessary to ensure the problem are: nondictator-
ship (no single voter's preferences dictate the outcome); Pareto efficiency (if all voters prefer X to
Y, Y should not win); universal admissibility (no voters' preferences are kept off the voters'
agenda); independence from irrelevant alternatives (the presence or absence of an alternative
that is itself not preferred should not affect the choice among remaining alternatives); and
transitivity (if voters prefer X to Y and Y to Z, X should be preferred to Z). See id. at 22-31.
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Arrow's problem clearly haunts the lawmaking process in a
direct democracy, but how does it bear on vote dilution in a represen-
tative democracy? Recall that previously we attempted to measure
vote dilution by reference to an ideal situation in which a majority of
voters agreed on an entire legislative program and the desirable
attributes of legislators. In the real world, of course, such a cohesive
majority is unthinkable. Instead, we find that one majority of voters
favors a certain defense policy, a different majority favors a certain
tax policy, a still different majority favors a particular candidate, and
so on. In a direct democracy, Arrow's problem may or may not arise,
depending upon whether the preferences of these different majorities
themselves cycle. If, for example, a majority favoring a certain
defense policy remains cohesive and favors that policy above all
alternative defense policies, Arrow's problem will not arise in a direct
democracy. On the other hand, if the majority that favors defense
policy D1 over D2 is noncohesive, and the presence of option D3
produces cycling, even direct democracy will be plagued by Arrow's
problem.
Now consider the situation in a representative democracy. No
matter how the district lines are drawn, the representatives elected
will not enact all the policies the different majorities favor, nor will
they possess all the other relevant characteristics the different ma-
jorities favor. Some policies and personal qualities will inevitably lose
out in any representative democracy. The question now becomes,
which ones should lose?
This is where Arrow's problem surfaces with a vengeance. If
the different majorities with respect to trade policy, taxation, health
care, and legislator character traits are asked which of these policies
and personalities they would most and least regret to see defeated in
the construction of a representative democracy, Arrow's problem
almost certainly will arise. The very differences among the voters
that block the formation of a single majority that agrees on everything
undoubtedly will block formation of a stable set of meta-preferences
regarding which majority-favored items should win and which should
lose. Only if we assume that a cohesive majority exists to say how
policies and personalities rank in importance-for example, that the
majority-favored foreign policy is more important than the majority-
favored welfare program or the majority-favored tax program-can we
determine which districting arrangement a majority would favor,




Basing districting on the policies a direct democracy would
produce presents a further problem. Many voter preferences, espe-
cially those relating to characteristics of representatives and not to
general policies, themselves depend on how voting districts are
drawn.18 Thus, if I am in an ethnically homogenous district, I might
prefer a representative with qualities A, B, and C, whereas if I am in
an ethnically heterogeneous district, I might prefer a representative
with qualities X, Y, and Z (the qualities most conducive to effective-
ness might vary with the nature of the constituents). Moreover, even
if I am in the majority on the issue of which qualities are preferable in
which districts, I may be in the minority when it comes to choosing
whether my district should in fact be ethnically homogeneous or het-
erogeneous; and the latter choice may have a majority that is itself
divided on the importance of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity in
comparison to other related choices, including the choice of represen-
tative qualities. Arrow's problem is thus inevitable in attempting to
achieve a stable set of majority preferences about which other major-
ity preferences should be honored and sacrificed in districting. And
because Arrow's problem denies us an ideal baseline of stable major-
ity preferences, it prevents us from determining how to draw the
districts.
The problem of drawing districts by reference to some ideal set
of majority preferences is actually quite familiar. Suppose a state has
a majority of blacks or Democrats. Does that mean that votes have
been diluted if district lines are drawn, or multimember districts
created, that likely will lead to a predominantly white or Republican
legislature? The answer is obviously "no." Every individual voter
who happens to be black or who identifies herself as a Democrat may
prefer in the abstract that blacks or Democrats dominate the legisla-
ture. But every way of assuring that outcome may trample upon
other preferences on which individual blacks and Democrats are quite
divided, and on which some of them join with individual whites and
Republicans to form a majority. 19  Some individual blacks and
18. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket At Last, 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 175, 224 ("Individual legislative elections are often intensely
personal matters, turning not in the slightest degree on which party the voter wants to control
the legislature.").
19. See the criticisms of proportional representation systems on these grounds in Peter H.
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1325, 1367-77 (1987).
Proportional representation schemes do not avoid Arrow's problem. For example, suppose
that the Democratic Party endorses policies 1, 2, and 3, and the Republican Party endorses
policies 4, 5, and 6. Voter 1 favors policies 1, 2, and 6. Because two of the three policies he
favors are policies the Democratic Party favors, he votes Democrat. Voter 2 favors policies 2, 3,
[Vol. 50:327334
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Democrats may think the foreign policy that most whites or
Republicans favor is preferable to the one most blacks or Democrats
favor, or they may favor a different domestic policy from most other
blacks or Democrats. Moreover, individual blacks and Democrats
might prefer some individual white or Republican candidates over the
individual black or Democratic candidates that other voting arrange-
ments would likely produce. And, of course, if they are in a minority,
blacks and Democrats are likely to split over whether they want to
control a minority of legislative seats or have great influence on a
majority of legislative seats.
As individual voters we are all blacks or nonblacks, Democrats"
or Republicans, hawks or doves, pro-regulation or pro-market, pro-
abortion or anti-abortion, and so on. Moreover, we are divided in a
vast number of other ways, including over which particular people
would be ideal representatives. Thus, no districting plan is "better" or
"worse" than any other, if the terms "better" and "worse" refer to the
people and policies that a given plan will likely prefer, and if the
terms reflect evaluations based on the standard that majority prefer-
ences should prevail.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our version of democracy combines substantive and procedural
conceptions. The substantive conception is embodied in the various
constitutional rights and rules that trump pure majoritarianism and
in the institution of judicial review that enforces those rights and
rules. It is not reflected in a concern for the demography of electoral
districts. Even those who argue for judicial enforcement of rights not
located in the constitutional text focus on the products of legislation,
not on how the legislatures are selected. To my knowledge, no court
or commentator has publicly advocated enforcing either textual or
nontextual rights through the roundabout method of specially tailor-
ing voting districts over the direct method of the judicial veto of legis-
lation. Not only does the indirect method call for skills that probably
no one, including judges, possesses, but it also has absolutely nothing
to commend it over the direct method. Such a method is not a sensi-
and 4 and again votes Democrat. Voter 3 favors policies 4, 5, and 6 and votes Republican. The
Democrats win (2 to 1) and enact policies 1, 2, and 3. The policies favored by a majority of
voters, however, are 2, 4, and 6. If the Republicans had won, policies 4 and 6 would have
prevailed, whereas only policy 2 prevailed under the Democrats.
1997]
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ble basis on which to premise judicial involvement in legislative dis-
tricting.
The procedural conception of democracy is reflected in the
principle of majoritarianism that is the default position in the elec-
toral and legislative processes. It is also reflected in the principle of
"one-person, one-vote" that the Supreme Court has found inherent in
the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and is likewise discernable
in the Court's close scrutiny of all restrictions on the franchise, and in
its deference to congressional extensions of the franchise. 2°
When courts attempt to move beyond the actual denial of the
franchise or the denial of voting equality in a quantitative sense and
focus on qualitative equality, they encounter an electorate that di-
vides along a multitude of different lines. As voters we are Democrats
and Republicans, blacks and whites, males and females. But we are
also hawks and doves, redistributionists and laissez-faire advocates.
We are atheists, agnostics, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims,
and Buddhists, all of various stripes. We are trade unionists and
managers, Main Streeters and cosmopoles. Some of us prefer hot,
charismatic candidates; others prefer cooler types. Some of us prefer
the well-educated or the well-bred. Others prefer regular Joes and
Joans. The list of our voting-relevant divisions is virtually endless.
Moreover, we are just as divided over how these divisions rank in
importance.
The upshot of this commonplace observation is that no stan-
dard exists beyond the mathematical "one-person, one-vote" by which
to measure vote dilution. We cannot say that anyone's votes are di-
luted if Democrats, blacks, Teamsters, Rotarians, or Catholics are
concentrated in a few voting districts, nor can we say that anyone's
votes are diluted if such groups are spread thinly among many voting
districts. No person qua Democrat or black can show that a given
districting plan harms that person in the form of vote dilution. Or if
she can, then so can someone else with respect to any alternative dis-
tricting plan. If every plan dilutes votes, we might as well say that no
plan does.
20. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (approving of § 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which provided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth
primary grade in an American school in which the predominant language is other than English
shall be disqualified from voting under a literacy test); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 327-28 (1966) (approving various remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). But
see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129-30 (1970) (disapproving of an amendment to the
Voting Rights Act of 1964 which mandated an 18-year-old voting eligibility requirement for
state and local elections).
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So where do I stand on intentional gerrymandering based on
race, political party, or incumbency? Are these acts not patently
unfair, and should they not therefore be deemed unconstitutional?
My answer is that while such practices are unseemly, and while the
drawing of lines based on race is unwholesome, I cannot conclude that
anyone is unfairly disadvantaged by such practices. 21 Or rather, if
people are unfairly disadvantaged, it is not because their representa-
tives and policies should have prevailed, but rather because fairness
requires an outcome-blind process for drawing district lines.22 If the
Constitution speaks to the drawing of district lines at all beyond "one-
person, one-vote," it should invalidate all outcome-driven plans, no
matter what proxies are used, whether they be race, political affili-
ation, or something else.
In conclusion, the outcome-blind drawing of district lines is
fair, no matter what the legislative results. But if it is also fair to let
outcomes drive the drawing of district lines, then no particular way of
doing so is unfair or "diluting," again no matter what the legislative
results. The way out of the political thicket is clearly marked. The
way through it does not exist.
21. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy,
1993 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 270, 278-81 (attacking Shaw v. Reno partly on the ground that no voter
inside or outside the racially gerrymandered district could show the harm required for stand-
ing). The Supreme Court, of course, disagrees. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485,
132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995); United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435-36, 132 L. Ed. 2d 635
(1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct.
1941, 1951, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996).
22. Perhaps this is what Shaw v. Reno and its progeny-Johnson, Hays, Shaw v. Hunt,
and Vera-are driving at in declaring race conscious processes for drawing district lines to be
unconstitutional. At the moment, however, almost all the Justices on the Supreme Court have
explicitly approved of outcome-driven districting plans. See, for example, Vera, 116 S. Ct. at
1954, 1969-70, 1974-75, 2011.
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